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Abstract-The relevance is due to the variability and 
incompleteness of modern tax legislation, which results in 
increased attention to the problems of applying tax rules 
with the use of analogy as a key technique for overcoming 
legal lacunae. The objective is to enhance the 
development of the doctrinal frameworks for the practice 
of applying the analogy of law and to identify the 
peculiarities of the implementation of this tool in the area 
of tax. The methodological framework involves general 
scientific (analysis and synthesis, abstraction and 
concretization) and special research methods 
(comparative legal, formal legal, technical legal, 
teleological). The method of analogy is both the key tool 
and the object of study. Arguments are presented 
supporting the suitability of the method of analogy for use 
in tax law. The application of tax legislation by analogy 
has been substantiated to not only permissible, but also 
necessary for the proper protection of taxpayers’ rights 
and counteracting infringement of fiscal interests. The 
necessity of introducing measures of deterrence of law 
enforcer’s discretion when using the analogy in the 
impact of tax law is revealed. The arguments against the 
direct regulatory legalization of the analogy in the tax law 
are presented. The work contributes to the enhancement 
of the general doctrinal provisions on the application of 
the analogy of law and serves as the basis for creating 
special parameters for applying this tool in taxation. 
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1. Introduction 
Analogy is one of the oldest universal human thought 
tools intended to compensate for the lack of 
information, and in legal terms it is one of the 
traditional means aimed at overcoming legal vagueness 
and meeting the gap in rules capable of resolving new 
or abnormal (unknown to existing norms) social 
relations involved into the sphere of legal effect. 
Analogy is very often used to facilitate understanding 
and to substantiate one’s point of view in everyday 
discourse [1].It is considered that arguments by 
analogy are most characteristic of legal reasoning, 
since the use of analogies makes the law more 
reproducible than it otherwise would be, and it allows 
lawyers to more accurately predict how a particular 
situation will be dealt with by law [2]. Since for tax 
law regulation of economic activities based on the 
principle of certainty of taxation, the completeness of 
regulation (no lack of information on the procedure for 
regulating each legally significant situation) is of 
particular (constitutionally significant) value [3], and 
absolute (full) tax certainty is an unachievable goal [4], 
especially in the context of tax reforms, so it seems 
extremely important to have clear legislative 
parameters, conditions and sector-specific limits of use 
of analogy in tax law – the application referred to 
relations within the scope of tax legislation, but not 
directly regulated by the law or other normative act 
provided for by it, of existing tax law and rules that are 
intended to regulate relations similar to loopholes in 
the law. Admittedly, the state of uncertainty in tax 
administration in a particular case, as in the practice of 
tax administration as a whole, can not only lead to an 
imbalance in the interests of individuals (taxpayers) 
subject to equal protection, who are forced to obey the 
authorities in the field of tax introduction and levying, 
in the process of implementation of tax control and tax 
liability, and the interests of the state, whose very 
existence depends largely on the completeness of tax 
collection, but also cause economic distortions, 
unequal and unfair tax burden. At the same time, the 
tax legislation in Russia does not only fail to define the 
essential and methodological framework necessary for 
the consistent and uniform application of the legal 
analogy when detecting tax and legal anomalies, 
forcing court practice to “deal with the incompleteness 
of legal regulation by trial and error” [5], but does not 
reply directly to the question about the lawfulness or 
inadmissibility of applying the analogy of law in order 
to overcome legal gaps in the field of taxation. In the 
Tax Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter – the 
Tax Code of the RF), although there is no special 
prohibition on the use of tax law by analogy, as it is 
done in Cl. 2 of Art. 3 of the Criminal Code of the RF 
in clarifying the principle of the legality while 
determining the criminality of acts and their punish 
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ability, but at the same time there are no norms similar 
to the rules of Cl. 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the 
RF, Art. 5 of the Family Code of the RF and Cl. 1 of 
Art. 7 of the Housing Code of the RF, defining the 
conditions and principles of the possible (ad hoc 
sanctioned) implementation of legislation by analogy 
in the relevant segments of legal life, which are outside 
the purview of the legislature. These circumstances 
actualize the scientific analysis of the theory and 
practice of using the analogy in the law in tax law 
regulation of economic activity, including setting the 
urgent task of doctrinal assessment of the possibility, 
expediency or even the need for direct legislative 
legalization of the legal mechanism of analogy in tax 
law. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Difficulties in determining the theoretical foundations 
and practical features of the operation of analogy 
method in the field of taxation entail not only failure to 
mention the tax law relating to this issue, but also the 
general cautious (if not wary) attitude of lawyers to the 
use of analogy in public law [6,7,8]. And not only 
criminal and administrative law, but also tax law are 
among those (public) industries where usually the 
acceptability of the analogy in the law is rejected(by 
the law itself or the unanimous attitude of judges and 
scholars)(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogy#Restri
ctions_on_the_use_of_analogy_in_law). Some tax 
experts, with references to the normative postulates 
“everyone should pay only legally established taxes” 
(Article 57 of the Constitution of the RF, cl. 1 of Art. 3 
of the RF Tax Code), “no one can be obliged to pay 
taxes and fees, as well as other contributions and 
payments that have signs of taxes or fees that are not 
provided for by the RF Tax Code or established in a 
different order than that defined by this Code”(cl. 5 of 
Article 3 of the Tax Code), “acts of legislation on taxes 
and fees should be formulated in such a way that 
everyone knows exactly what taxes, when and in what 
order he must pay” (cl. 6, Art. 3 of the RF Tax Code) 
declare an analogy in the field of taxation“ out of the 
law”[9], completely rejecting the possibility of 
applying this method to overcome the uncertainty in 
tax law [10]. In such cases, it has traditionally been 
underlined that in tax law, as in one of the branches of 
public law (as opposed to private law), law enforcers 
should not be given the authority to fill the legal gaps 
using such techniques as analogy of law or legislation. 
The denial of the applicability of the analogy of law in 
the taxation mechanism is superimposed on the general 
perception of the legal analogy widely used in modern 
literature as an undesirable, redundant and worst tool 
suitable for use in legal effect only as a last resort [11], 
if other methods did not clarify [12] (regardless of the 
private or public nature of the legal relationship to be 
regulated), since how to use an analogy is usually 
“poorly taught and poorly practiced” [13], and the 
analogy itself is “an extremely controversial and 
complex form of reasoning” [14], and as a rule, “does 
not cover all the situation as a whole and raises 
additional issues ”[15].It is noted, in particular, that, 
using the analogy in authorized cases, judges 
themselves acknowledge the inferiority and 
institutional limitations of the arguments based on this 
technique [16].According to some legal experts, the 
application of the law by analogy is not allowed by 
default and requires legal authorization[17]. In the field 
of taxation, such an assessment leads to an opinion that 
the use of the analogy of law while regulating tax 
relations is sometimes permissible, but being closely 
associated with emerging doubts, ambiguities and 
contradictions, it is always a forced measure, an 
exception to the general rule [18]. The negative attitude 
towards analogy of law is also associated with an 
important element of discretion, which the analogy 
introduces into the mechanism of legal regulation. So, 
one cannot but agree that in the condition so flegalun 
certainty, the use of analogy as a whole is one of the 
forms of exercising is certiorari powers [19], 
becausethesubjectsoflawenforcementareforcedtosearch
forapplicablerules,compare legal gaps and prescribed 
legal relations, check the inconsistency of the norms 
applied by analogy to the substance of disputed 
relations and monitor the implementation of the main 
principles of the relevant branch of law, considering 
personal ideas about analogy and conformity, which 
naturally enhances their discretionary capabilities. This 
often provides the grounds to consider analogous 
reasoning no more than a “mask for unrecognized 
judicial lawmaking” [20], despite the fact that currently 
“neither the Russian legal mentality nor the level of 
law enforcers’ professionalism can cope with the extent 
of freedom provided by analogy”[21].In addition, 
although discretionary powers are defined by law and 
provide for the legal right to choose behavior [22], they 
also give tax authorities some freedom, which in some 
cases borders on arbitrariness, which leads to an 
unjustified expansion of discretion and violation of the 
principles of competence, responsibility and 
compliance with professional conduct [23]. Indeed, the 
distortion of the principle of social justice is caused not 
only by the absence of legal norms capable of fixing 
existing economic relations, but also by the discretion 
of law enforcers who are forced to fill loopholes in the 
law [24].With regard to tax law regulation in economic 
activity, the intensity of negative coloring of analogy as 
a method related to discretion increases, since “among 
various executive branches of state regulation it is in 
the field of taxation that the use of discretionary 
powers by tax authorities generates the strongest 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt  Vol. 8, No. 3, June 2019 
495 
feelings and complaints among taxpayers” [25], and if 
enforcement discretion is acceptable, in principle, in 
tax law, it is necessary to determine the system of 
measures for limiting it in the clearest possible way 
[26]. 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
The methodological basis of the presented research 
consists of general scientific (analysis and synthesis, 
abstraction and concretization) and particular scientific 
(special) research methods (comparative legal, formal 
legal, technical legal and teleological interpretation). 
The leading scientific tool and at the same time the 
object of research is the method of legal analogy. To 
achieve the defined objectives of the research, it was 
necessary to analyze the doctrinal attitudes of Russian 
and foreign lawyers on issues of motives, reasons, 
positive and negative aspects of the actual use of the 
analogy of law in the field of taxation. The regulatory 
framework of the study includes the provisions of the 
Russian tax legislation enshrined in the Tax Code of 
the RF(part one of July 31, 1998 No. 146-FZ, part two 
of August 5, 2000 No. 117-FZ), in the context of this 
study the most important of which are the foundations 
(principles) of the Russian legislation on taxes and 
fees, as well as the norms applied by analogy in actual 
practice. Since the institute of analogy itself cannot 
exist only in theoretical structures, it “comes to life” in 
direct law enforcement and is revealed through the 
prism of practice, the creation of this article required a 
broad empirical basis, represented by a number of 
specific judicial acts containing a legal assessment of 
the legal gaps discovered in tax legislation and related 
with courts arguing for a positive or negative attitude 
towards the possibility of using the analogy method to 
resolve a dispute. 
 
4. Results 
The basic result of this research is the argumentation of 
increasing the relevance of the scientific elaboration of 
the theory and practice related to using the analogy of 
law in modern tax regulation of economic activity. The 
reasons for the complete denial or assertion of the 
limited applicability of analogy of law in the taxation 
mechanism by scientists and legal practitioners have 
been revealed. Despite the public, administrative and 
authoritative nature of the legal impact in the tax 
regulation sphere, it has been theoretically justified and 
confirmed as exemplified with specific practical cases 
that such a manifestation of the implementation of 
analogy method in the law, as the application of tax 
legislation by analogy, is not only admissible but 
necessary. The analogy of law in tax regulations is 
proposed (subject to the necessary conditions and 
limits) as lawful by default. The reasonableness of this 
conclusion is highlighted by the dramatically negative 
assessment found in the doctrine of a special regulatory 
prohibition on the use of analogy in the taxation 
mechanism established by the legislation of the 
Republic of Belarus. It has been determined that the 
system of limits for the use of tax legislation by 
analogy noted in science can be expressed by two 
fundamental principles: the “nullumtributum sine lege” 
and the “nullumpoena sine lege”. The particular 
examples show the perception and effective observance 
of these limits in judicial practice. As an additional 
limit to the tax analogy in the tax regulation impact, it 
is proposed to consider the need to link each case of 
application of the tax law by analogy to the restriction 
of discretion of the law enforcer. The idea of the need 
to secure the requirement for profound motivation by 
courts to use the analogy of law while resolving tax 
disputes at the level of an appropriate clarification of 
the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RF was put 
forward. Establishing such requirements will not only 
limit the excessive discretion implemented within the 
framework of analogy and create a basis for monitoring 
the observance of analogy limits, but also relieve the 
legislator from the need to formulate and enshrine rules 
directly admitting the law in the Tax Code of the RF. 
 
5. Discussion 
The lack of direct substantive legalization of the tax 
analogy along with the aforesaid doctrinal positions in 
Russian realities led to the emergence of judicial acts 
indicating that the tax legislation “does not provide for 
opportunities” and even tougher – “does not allow” the 
application of the law by analogy (see, for instance: Cl. 
7, Information Letter of Presidium of the Supreme 
Court of Arbitration of the RF of May 31, 1999 No. 41 
“Review of the Practice of Applying the Law 
Regulating the Specifics of Banks’ Taxation by 
Arbitration Courts”; Resolution of the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service in the Volga-Vyatsky District of 
August 1, 2000 No. A43-1302/00-32-88; Decision of 
the Supreme Arbitration Court of the RF of January 26, 
2005 No. 16141/04). In Ruling of March 13, 2003 No. 
F08-693/2003-259A, the FAC of the North Caucasus 
District drew the attention of lower courts to the fallacy 
of the statement that similar functions performed by the 
public movement employees (a taxpayer in a disputable 
legal relationship) and lawyers in the procedural 
representation of individuals in court (the provision of 
legal services to citizens on a reimbursable basis) give 
this social movement the right to pay taxes by analogy 
of law in the same tax regime that is established for bar 
associations. At the same time, the cassation court 
clarified that the tax legislation does not contain rules 
that allow the application of law by analogy. In another 
case, faced with a gap in regulating the procedure and 
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determining cases of granting deferral (installment 
plan) of arrears in insurance premiums (corresponding 
to penalties and fines), courts of first, appellate and 
cassation instances when meeting the applicant’s 
requirements for granting deferral of insurance 
contributions in compulsory pension insurance and 
compulsory health insurance due to the fact that the 
applicant was in a difficult financial situation, 
proceeded from the fact that the absence in the 
legislation of the mechanism regulating the 
organization of work on granting a deferment 
(installment plan) to pay these fees cannot be a basis 
for violating the applicant’s right to timely review his 
application for deferral (installment plan) and to a 
substantiated response. At the same time, the courts 
substantiated their position by the possibility of 
applying, by analogy, the norms of the Tax Code of the 
RF, establishing the rules and grounds for changing the 
deadlines for procedure of taxes payment (Chapter 9 of 
the Tax Code of the RF) to the controversial legal 
relations, because of the similarity of legal relations in 
paying taxes and contributing insurance premiums, as 
well as with the absence of a direct legislative ban on 
such an analogy. However, the Presidium of the 
Supreme Court of Arbitration of RF did not support the 
mentioned approach of the lower courts, stated that 
such analogies were unacceptable and indicated that in 
the absence of direct legislative permission from the 
monitoring bodies there are no grounds for granting a 
deferral (installment plan) for repayment of insurance 
premiums (see: Ruling of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Arbitration Court of the RF of April 16, 2013 
No. 16929/12). Noteworthy is that the FAC of the 
Moscow District in Decision No. KA-A40/2508-07 of 
April 10, 2007, considering the taxpayer’s dispute with 
the tax authority regarding the legality of applying 
VAT deductions, rejected the reference of the tax 
authority to Cl. 1 of Art. 374 of the Tax Code, which 
determines the object of taxation on property of 
organizations. Not considering permissible the use of 
the norms establishing certain elements of a specific 
tax in relation to other taxes, the court additionally 
referred to the absence in the Tax Code of provisions 
on the application of the analogy of law. Considering 
another controversial situation related to the gap in tax 
law, the FAC of the Ural district stated in the Decision 
of July 29, 2002 No. F09-1549/02-АКthat the analogy 
in tax legislation is not applicable and refused to apply 
the provisions of Art. 69 of the RF Tax Code, 
establishing the procedure for drawing up and sending 
tax claims, for an analogy, to partially unresolved 
relations, referring to the tax authorities’ requirements 
for the taxpayer to provide documents of accounting 
and tax accounting. Among similar (denying the 
legitimacy of analogy of law in the field of taxation) 
acts, 
attentionshouldbepaidtotherecentDecisionoftheSuprem
eCourtoftheRFofDecember 26, 2017(approved by the 
Presidium of the Supreme Court of the RF on March 
28, 2018), mentioned in the 
“ReviewofthejudicialpracticeoftheSupremeCourtofthe
RussianFederationNo. 1 (2018)”, with regard to case 
No. 305-КG17-12383, in which the courtratherun 
equivocally formulated a position, by virtue of which, 
consideringtheprincipleofformalcertaintyofnormscomm
onforallobligatorypaymentsenshrinedinCl. 6 of Art. 3 
of the Tax Code of the RF, 
theprocedureforcalculatingtheutilizationfeeandthecorre
spondingdutiesofthepayersofthisfee(all essential 
elements of the legal structure of tax collection, 
including its base rate and calculation procedure, must 
be established by law and regulations adopted in 
accordance with it, and the identification of these 
elements and duties of tax payers in law enforcement 
corresponding to them, as well as filling the gaps in the 
order of calculating the fee by analogy, cannot be 
considered legitimate) cannot be established by 
applying the rules of law by analogy. Due to the 
circums tances of the mentioned case, the owner of 
foreign-made self-propelled loaders liable to the 
utilization collection in the absence of a regulatory 
definition of the “maximum technically permissible 
mass” for self-propelled machines submitted to the 
customs authority a calculation of the fee, laying the 
loader’s structural weight determined by its maker as 
the basis for determining its size. The customs 
authority found it necessary to use by analogy the rules 
of the Technical Regulations of the Customs Union 
“On the safety of wheeled vehicles”, approved by the 
Decision of the Commission of the Customs Union 
dated December 9, 2001 No. 877, according to which 
the technically permissible maximum mass of a 
wheeled vehicle is determined, i.e. the maximum mass 
of a vehicle with equipment, passengers and cargo 
specified by the manufacturer. Based on this, in the 
opinion of the customs authority (supported by the 
courts of first, appellate and cassation instances), when 
calculating the utilization fee for loaders, in addition to 
the design weight, the load capacity of loaders should 
be taken into account, i.e. the maximum technically 
permissible weight of the loader should be the sum of 
the mass of the self-propelled machine and its carrying 
capacity, and with such a calculation of the collection, 
its value for each loader should be twice (not the single 
one applied by the collection payer) the size of the base 
rate. However, the Supreme Court of the RF, denying 
the admissibility of analogy of law in this case, pointed 
out that if there is uncertainty in the legal regulation, 
such discretionary (through analogy) law enforcement 
is illegal and leads to an increase in the fiscal burden. 
Following this logic, 
itisindeedpossibletoconcludethattheuseofanalogyintaxr
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egulationofeconomicrelationsisprohibitedpursuanttothe
generalrule, but allowed only as alastr sort or only in 
specially specified cases, in particular, 
whenthelegislatorestablishestheruleintendedtoregulates
pecificrelations, and he himself indicates that other 
(similar) relations are to be settled “in a similar 
way”(for instance, according to Cl. 3, Art. 58 of the 
Tax Code of the RF, the payment of advance payments 
of tax during the tax period may be provided, while the 
obligation to make advance payments shall be deemed 
executed in a way similar to the payment of tax; in 
accordance with Cl. 1, Art. 156 of the Tax Code of the 
RF, taxpayers, when doing business in the interests of 
another person, on the basis of mandate agreements, 
commission agreements or agency agreements, 
determine the tax base as the amount of income 
received by them as remuneration (any other income) 
when performing any of the specified agreements, and 
in a similar way the tax base is determined when the 
pledgee sells the subject of the unclaimed pledge 
owned by the pledger in accordance with the procedure 
established by the legislation of the RF).Following this 
logic there is a scientific approach, according to which 
although the overcoming loopholes in legal regulation 
of tax duties of participants in economic relations by 
judiciary is permissible, but cannot occur as a regular 
activity and should be related to “exceptional acts” 
[27]. At the same time, it seems true that the 
achievement of absolute lack of gaps in the law is 
almost impossible due to the dynamism and variability 
of actual relations that constantly require 
modernization of the regulatory framework [28].Even 
the most accurate rule is potentially inaccurate “due to 
our imperfect knowledge of the world and our limited 
ability to foresee the future”, the most accurate term 
can be vague when we encounter a case that is not 
expected (unforeseen) while defining this term 
[29].Therefore, it is possible to support the opinion that 
a complete ban (including a ban by default – auth.) on 
the application of tax legislation by analogy would 
make it impossible to exercise a number of rights 
granted to taxpayers by the Tax Code of the RF, and 
would in fact paralyze the activities of tax authorities 
[30].Indeed, the interests of taxpayers and the opposing 
fiscal and controlling interests of public authority are 
so diverse that many of them are “not formalized and 
exist outside the framework of law on taxes and fees” 
[31]. It is also true that the idea of eradication of 
discretion is utopian in its essence, justice is not only a 
form of enforcement, but permeated by discretionary 
principles, and the risk of abuse by the courts or tax 
authorities which is predetermined by using the 
analogy method by discretion is not a reason or 
justification for completely refusing to use this method, 
for it is known that “abusus non to llitusum” (an abuse 
does not remove the use). Since gaps in the legal 
regulation of economic activity is an inevitable 
phenomenon, the positive potential of the analogy 
should not be ignored as applied to the tax segment of 
regulation of legal relations, having in mind that in 
Russian and foreign literature (despite some doubts and 
fears) this potential is generally considered the oldest, 
habitual and effective means of overcoming legal 
uncertainty, keeping the regulatory impact within the 
principle of the equality of everyone before the law  
and being able to effectively work in the regulation of 
both horizontal and vertical economic relations. The 
analogy is generally immanent in thinking, everyday 
practical and theoretical reasoning, and it plays a 
significant role in the law in promoting doctrinal 
stability and systemic consistency, creates the principle 
of reproducibility of the way to reach a legal objective 
and, therefore, predictability of legal planning. It is 
necessary to consider the fact that the method of 
analogy in taxation can play a positive role among the 
tools that mediate the suppression of taxpayers’ actions 
aimed at illegally reducing the tax burden or evading 
taxes. 
It is appropriate to recall here that in procedural acts 
regulating the procedure for courts to overcome legal 
gaps through the application of legislation by analogy 
(Cl. 6, Art. 15 of the Code of Administrative Judicial 
Procedure of the RF, Cl. 6, Art.13 of the Code of 
Arbitration Procedure of the RF, Cl. 3, Art. 11 of the 
Civil Procedure Code of the RF), 
anyexemptionsrelatedtotheconsiderationoftaxdisputesar
enotprovided.In addition, the legal position of the 
Constitutional Court of the RF should be taken into 
account, according to which the gap in legal regulation, 
which remains as a result of the inaction of state 
authorities (authorized and obliged to eliminate such a 
gap) for a long time sufficient to eliminate it, cannot 
serve as an insurmountable obstacle to controversial 
issues, if the implementation of the rights and 
legitimate interests of citizens arising from the 
Constitution of the RF depends on it (Definition of 
April 9, 2002 No. 68-O). In view of the foregoing, it 
seems quite logical and natural that the negative 
scientific assessment of the introduction of analogy in 
tax regulation, cited above, does not prevail in the 
literature review, and the law-enforcement positions 
based on it remained few. In real practice, the approach 
that analogy of law, being a universal (general legal) 
means of casual overcoming legal gaps and not only 
possible but necessary in tax law, has become 
essentially common and doctrinal confirmed, , and a 
general ban on tax analogy, serving as one of the main 
means of maintaining consistency in the tax 
mechanism is unacceptable. At the same time, it is 
predicted that in the future, the value of judicial 
practice in tax disputes (in the context of the situational 
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replenishment of legal gaps) will increase. A textbook 
example of an adequate (contributing not only to 
resolving a specific tax dispute, but also encouraging 
the legislator to improve the Tax Code of the RF) 
application of analogy in the law in tax law regulation 
is how the courts, faced with the lack of a statutory 
regulated procedure for offsetting and refund of 
excessively imposed fines, allowed the use of the 
provisions of Art. 79 of the Tax Code of the RF 
referring to the relevant relations. Earlier (before 
making changes to this Article on the basis of 
established practice), due to the literal interpretation, it 
intended only for regulating the issues of offsetting and 
returning overly collected taxes, fees and penalties, but 
not determining the procedure for offsetting and 
returning a fine. In particular, the FAC of the Moscow 
District in its Ruling No. KA-A40/5108-08 of June 18, 
2008 did not take into account the argument of the tax 
authority about the non-use of Art. 79 of the RF Tax 
Code in the framework of the dispute on fine 
reimbursement, noting that the legislator did not 
specifically prohibit the application of the procedure 
provided for in Art. 79 of RF Tax Code to the 
procedure for offsetting and refund of an excessively 
collected fine, the absence in the Tax Code of the RF 
of a procedure for offsetting and refund of an 
excessively collected fine cannot serve as a basis for 
maintaining the disputed amount in the budget, and 
therefore the provisions of Art. 79 of the RF Tax Code 
can be applied in appropriate cases by analogy in the 
law. The practice of using the provisions of Art. 78 of 
the Tax Code of the RF for an analogy deserves to be 
supported. These provisions regulate the procedure for 
the return of taxes when resolving disputes related to 
the accrual and collection from the tax authority of 
interest at the rate of the Central Bank of the RF, 
charged in case of violation by the tax authority of Art. 
176 of the RF Tax Code for the default on payment 
refund of VAT paid to suppliers of goods, works, 
services purchased in the territory of the RF (including 
cases of unlawful refusal to apply tax deductions for 
the amount of such tax).In particular, the FAC of the 
North-West District stated in the Rulings of February 
10, 2003 No. A52/2603/2002/2 and of October 14, 
2002 No. A52/1297/2002/2 that the absence of the 
procedure for calculating interest for late payment of 
VAT (i.e., there is a gap as to which body and in what 
order should charge and pay) in Art. 176 of the Tax 
Code, cannot be an obstacle to the realization of the 
payer’s right to receive the specified interest. The 
courtalsoclarified that the Tax Code of the RF 
doesnotcontainanyspecialrestrictionsontheapplicationof
thisnormfor an analogy when considering claims of tax 
payers to the tax authorities. 
A very indicative case of applying the tax analogy is an 
example of a casual defining of the notion of a legal 
term predetermining the assessment of the legality of 
the taxpayer’s choice of the zero rate of VAT for 
services related to the export of goods. Faced with the 
fact that Cl. 2.5, Art. 164 of the Tax Code of the RF, 
relating works (services)performed (rendered) by 
Russian organizations (other than pipeline 
transportation organizations) in sea and river ports for 
transshipment of goods moved across the border of the 
RF to the number of operations subject to zero rate of 
VAT, does not define the notion of the term 
“transshipment”, the Arbitration Court of the North-
Caucasus District in Ruling No. F08-378/2015 of 
March 13, 2015 considered it possible and necessary to 
be guided by analogy with other norms of tax 
legislation regulating homogeneous (similar) legal 
relations with the participation of pipeline 
transportation organizations (sub-sub-cl.4 of sub-clause 
2.2 of Cl. 1 Tax CodeoftheRF), and defines 
“transshipment” as “loading, unloading, discharge, 
filling, labeling, sorting, packaging, moving within the 
boundaries of the sea, river port, technological 
stockpiles of cargo, bringing cargo into transportable 
condition, their fastening and separation”. Based on 
this understanding of the term “transshipment”, the 
court admitted grounded the use by the taxpayer of a 
zero tax rate for services rendered, albeit outside the 
port area, but using a special terminal designed to 
receive, temporarily store, accumulate shipload of 
greasers and send them to port. 
The judicial approach to overcoming the gap in 
regulating the issue of the term during which the 
taxpayer is entitled to submit an application for 
offsetting overpaid taxes and fees (overpayments) 
against future payments (until recent changes, Art. 78 
of the Tax Code of the RF determined only the 
limitation period for application for the return of the 
relevant amounts, leaving the outlined question 
open).Based on the fact that the deadline for filing an 
application for offsetting tax overpayment in the Tax 
Code of the RF has not been established, and 
considering that offsetting and refund of overpaid and 
overcharged taxes are independent ways of restoring 
the taxpayer’s property status violated by overpayment 
or collection, it would be possible to allow for 
submitting an application for offsetting beyond the 
time limit set for filing a claim for return. However, the 
Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the RF 
in Ruling No. 5735/05 of August 23, 2005 set up the 
position that there are no significant differences in their 
economic content between offset and refund of tax 
payments, and in fact (because of this similarity), 
offsetting overpaid tax amounts is a type (form) of the 
return of these amounts, the restoration of the 
taxpayer’s property status. Because of this, applying 
the three-year deadline for filing an application for 
return by analogy, the Presidium of the Supreme 
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Arbitration Court of the RF supported the position of 
the tax authority and upheld the latter’s decision to 
refuse to offset overpayment due to a taxpayer’s 
skipping of the specified three-year period. This law 
enforcement position is remarkable in that the case was 
resolved in favor of the tax authority, contrary to the 
interests of the taxpayer. 
The above special cases clearly demonstrate that the 
analogy of law in the general legal sense and in relation 
to taxation is a legitimate and socially positive means. 
At the same time, these examples refute the idea 
existing in science about the restraint of analogy 
practice in tax law by the procedural sphere (the ability 
of the analogy to overcome exclusively procedural 
gaps) and the tendency to protect taxpayers’ interests 
(the justification of the analogy just in cases when 
protecting taxpayers’ interests) [12].That is, the 
analogy in tax law not only acts as a means of ensuring 
the taxpayer’s legitimate interests, adapting suitable 
protective tools to abnormal situations, but also 
contributes to filling the state budget, struggling with 
unreasonable withdrawal from tax duties. 
Thus, it can be concluded that, in tax laws, despite the 
public, administrative and authoritative nature of the 
legal impact, such kind of the work of analogy, as the 
use of tax legislation by analogy, is quite common, 
since, on the one hand, it is necessary and inevitable 
and, on the other hand, legitimate by default. 
Confirmation of accuracy of such a conclusion can also 
be seen in sharply negative assessment in science terms 
of the direct regulatory ban on the use of tax law by 
analogy, established in the legislation of the Republic 
of Belarus (Cl. 7, Art. 3 of the Tax Code of the 
Republic of Belarus of December 19, 2002, No. 166-
З). This prohibition is considered “absolutely 
unreasonable” and having “an extremely limited 
scientific potential, which in no way can be considered 
systemic”. 
It should be certainly borne in mind that, in general, 
just as analogy of law cannot be limitless, so in tax 
laws, a number of limits must be observed, including 
industry specifics. With a view to the generally 
accepted rule in science about the inadmissibility of the 
application by analogy of norms that establish the 
consequences of their actions (inaction) that are 
unfavorable for subjects of law, considering the 
principle of legality and certainty of taxation, the right 
to the tax analogy should be denied in situations when 
it comes to the sphere of introduction (establishment) 
of taxes and fees, the definition of elements of taxation, 
the qualification of the elements of the tax offense and 
the application of measures of tax law responsibility. 
These general limits of analogy in the law in tax law 
quite clearly and fully express two well-known 
maxims: the “nullumtributum sine lege” and “the 
nullumpoena sine lege”. Indeed, there is a consensus in 
science that judges do not have the right to spread their 
authority beyond the law by analogy, that applying the 
analogy in tax liability would violate the general legal 
principles of clarity and certainty of regulatory regime 
and that, in general, analogy in tax law cannot be used 
by tax authorities as a means of restricting and 
suppressing taxpayer’s rights [18]. 
The proper perception of the specified limits of the 
analogy in tax law regulation is reflected in judicial 
practice. Thus, in Decision No. 2742/03 of 14 May 
2003 of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the RF, it 
was flatly stated that filling the gap in the law by 
applying an analogy with respect to the subject and 
elements of the tax liability (in the controversial case, it 
was an attempt to spread the procedure  of contributing 
the amount of income tax to the budget for 
organizations that are not payers of income tax because 
they have privileges and do not have a tax base for 
calculating the tax, in particular, organizations of 
persons with disabilities), is “unacceptable from the 
point of view of the concept of the lawfully established 
law. The Ruling of the FAC of the West Siberian 
District of May 23, 2005 No. F04-3146/2005 (11503-
А45-40) unequivocally determined that, in the absence 
of a direct indication in the law, when calculating the 
profit tax of organizations, it is illegal to use the norms 
of Ch. 21 of the TC RF on VAT and determine the 
income of the borrower of promissory notes in the form 
of savings on interest. 
The FAС of the East-Siberian District spoke no less 
clearly, stating that the use of analogy in regulating tax 
relations associated with establishing the basic 
elements of taxation, including the deadline for tax 
payment, is not allowed, considering the constitutional 
principle of legal establishment of taxes and fees, and 
therefore the court in a particular situation, having 
discovered the absence of a statutory deadline for 
paying road user tax, refused to the tax authority the 
right to determine this period by analogy and 
recognized calculation of penalties for late payment of 
tax as inappropriate (Ruling of October 24, 2002 No. 
A19-12887/01-15-32-F02-3122/02-C1).The courts 
have a strong position with regard to the fact that the 
application of a tax sanction established for a different 
(not identical to controversial) set of elements of a tax 
offense, although similar for a number of elements, is 
not provided by the law, and therefore is not 
permissible (Ruling of FAC of the West Siberian 
District of January 12, 2006 No. F04-9373/2005 
(18371-А45-25).The idea of the inapplicability of the 
analogy in the mechanism for engaging to tax liability 
is very clearly demonstrated in the Ruling of the 
Arbitration Court of the Moscow District of May 19, 
2016 No. F05-5884/2016, where the court rejected the 
applicant’s arguments about the possibility of applying 
the provisions of the Tax Code of the RF when 
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establishing the fact of interdependence and affiliation, 
since otherwise would contradict the constitutional 
principles of legal liability, which, along with the 
requirements of Art. 54 of the Constitution of the RF 
also include the principles of legal certainty and 
proportionality of responsibility. 
Since analogy in tax law did not receive special 
substantive legal permission and, as was shown, the 
actual use of analogy is a manifestation of 
discretionary enforcement powers, it can be supported 
also in relation to Russian realities that it is necessary 
to exert particular vigilance with regard to the fact that 
discretionary powers did not gradually move to the 
area of means of receiving state revenues without 
sufficient grounds and at the expense of traditional 
values of the rule of law. In other words, an additional 
limit to the permissible implementation of the method 
of analogy in the tax law regulation of economic 
relations should be considered the need to pair the 
analogy with the restriction (restraint) of discretion 
inherent in this method. 
The scientific point of view was expressed that the 
conditions, limits and rules for applying analogy of law 
and analogy in justice in taxation need official 
legalization (legislatively fixed directly in the Tax 
Code of the RF). According to some legal scholars, the 
special significance of the analogy in resolving tax 
disputes, as well as the need to counter possible abuses 
in its application, “strongly demand” the inclusion of a 
rule on the mechanism under consideration in the Tax 
Code of the RF  (we mean a rule that would give 
definition of analogy, consolidated the grounds for its 
use and limits of application) [32]. 
On the one hand, the idea to provide the law enforcer 
with legislative guidelines, which, by applying tax 
rules by analogy, would allow each time keeping 
within the framework of the basic principles of tax 
legislation, looks quite reasonable. But on the other 
hand, without a proper doctrinal and methodological 
basis, apart from the accumulated and thoroughly 
analyzed positive and negative experience of actual 
practical use of the analogy in resolving tax disputes 
(or refusing to use this technique), the proposed 
legislative guidelines can be only general and 
overlapping known theoretical postulates about the 
essence, conditions and limits of the application of 
analogy of law and virtually useless. Moreover, if now 
(in the context of failure to mention the law on the 
admissibility of tax legislation by analogy) every case 
when the courts resort to this method of overcoming 
gaps in tax law is associated with serious doubts and 
reflections, then if there is a direct authorization by the 
legislator, the courts’ appeal to analogy can become 
ubiquitous, poorly controlled and risks becoming a 
means of arguing and legalizing law enforcement 
arbitrariness. In other words, 
atpresentsuchincentivestoactivelyapplytheanalogyintax
relationscanbedangerous.  
To provide an opportunity to control and, if necessary, 
qualitatively challenge the results of such analogous 
enforcement in the tax area, which goes beyond the 
allowable, considering the need to minimize the 
possible negative effects of discretionary powers of the 
courts, it is extremely important not only to insist on 
complying with the above mentioned analogies, but 
also require justification of the presence of the 
necessary prerequisites (conditions) and the absence of 
obstacles to the use of analogy. The courts should, 
through the prism of the circumstances of a particular 
tax dispute, reflect in as much detail as possible the 
rules for applying the law by analogy, developed in the 
theory of law, and specifically: indicate the presence of 
a gap, substantiate the real (rather than seeming) nature 
of the gap, reveal the applied criteria of similarity in 
finding properly regulated relationships similar to the 
gaps, show the necessary and sufficient depth of the 
analogy, prove the conformity of the act adopted by 
analogy to the basic principles of tax legislation to 
confirm that the application of a particular rule by 
analogy does not conflict with the legal nature of the 
disputed legal relationship and does not distort the 
essence of the rule applied. The formal preservation of 
such a requirement, as well as the presentation of the 
methodological recommendations for its 
implementation, seems to be carried out properly by 
adopting an appropriate resolution of the Plenum of the 
Supreme Court of the RF. 
6. Conclusions 
Thus, we can conclude that analogy of law as a way to 
overcome the incompleteness of legislation and 
achieve legal certainty is not at all alien and a priori 
negative element in the mechanism of tax regulation of 
economic activity. It has been substantiated that, 
despite being justifiability of a cautious attitude to the 
intensive use of the instrument under investigation in 
public branches of law, including taxation, the 
reticence of the Russian legislator on the presence or 
absence of the possibility to fill gaps in tax law by 
analogy should be considered as a tacit consent of it. A 
different approach, on the one hand, would prevent 
proper protection of taxpayers’ interests, and on the 
other, would weaken the stability of the tax system and 
reduce the degree of protection of the treasury from the 
negative consequences of tax evasion. The analysis of 
judicial practice based on the denial of the applicability 
of analogy in tax law allowed us emphasizing that the 
instrument in question cannot and should not be 
applied in the field of taxation every where. Immediate 
over coming of gaps in tax law by means of analogy is 
admissible upon occurrence of certain conditions (the 
presence of an actual gap, sufficient similarity of the 
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gap and legal relations, non-contradiction of the 
applicable rule to the essence of the gap relationship) 
and being subject to special limits (the inadmissibility 
of applying the analogy for establishing taxes and their 
elements, the failure to use analogies to determine tax 
offenses and bring violators to tax liability). Supporting 
the idea that, on the whole, the analogy of law in tax 
relations cannot be used by tax authorities as a means 
of restricting rights and suppressing taxpayer’s 
economic freedoms, did not prevent from noting the 
existence of adequate, positive judicial practice of 
applying tax rules not only in favor of the taxpayer, but 
also in defense budget interests. Since the analogy of 
law inevitably causes an increase in the degree of 
discretion of the law enforcer (when qualifying a legal 
gap, when establishing criteria for the similarity of gap 
and legal relations, when determining whether the 
substance of the disputed relations corresponds to the 
legal nature of the rules to be applied), that in the field 
of taxes is particularly sensitive to economic actors, so 
it is proposed to strive to create such conditions (rules) 
for the application of tax legislation by analogy, which 
would suggest adjunction of analogy with the restraint 
(restriction) of freedom of enforcement, which would 
prevent administrative or judicial arbitrariness. In this 
aspect, the basic rule for applying the tax analogy may 
be the requirement that courts comply with the 
mandatory reasoning for the presence of conditions and 
the absence of obstacles to the application of the 
analogy of law when resolving tax disputes in the 
context of incomplete legislation. Such a requirement, 
along with the basic generalizations of legally and 
economically adequate practice of actually using the 
method of analogy in tax and legal regulation, should 
be fixed at the level of the decision of the Plenum of 
the Supreme Court of the RF, which eliminates the 
need to formulate and enshrine rules in the Tax Code 
of the RF directly admitting the analogy of tax law. 
Only provided enhancing legal culture of subjects of 
tax interaction, sufficient scope of actual use, and as a 
result of accumulation of theoretical and 
methodological developments, uniting them into a 
single systematic block, the institute of analogy is able 
to receive tangible eligible reflection in TC of the RF. 
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